Emergent realities for social wellbeing : environmental, spatial and social pathways by Agius, John et al.
  379
Pivot IV 
Social Wellbeing 
Zonqor Paradelia 
Stepped Hill identified in 2015
UTM 33N (ED50) (461372.177, 3971523.265, -17.965 m), 
35° 53’ 11.8980” N, 14° 34’ 19.3497” E
 380 Emergent Realities for Social Wellbeing: Environmental, Spatial and Social Pathways
  381
C H A P T E R  1 8
Risk Assessment: Supporting Public Policy in an 
Uncertain World
John Agius, Marc Bonazountas, George Karagiannis, Elena Krikigianni and 
Chrysovalantis Tsiakos 
Introduction
As the emergency management paradigm shifted from response to prevention in the 
1980s (Auf Der Heide, 1989), risk assessment progressively turned into a key requirement 
for civil protection authorities (Schwab, Eschelbach, and Brower, 2007). The European 
Commission Directorate-General launched the Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines 
for Disaster Management in 2010, whilst the European Parliament and Council Decision 
1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism requires Member-States to 
develop risk assessments at national or appropriate sub-national level by 2015 (FIAU, 
2013). In parallel, the development of national risk assessments (NRA) became an ex ante 
conditionality (Baubion, 2013) of the EU Cohesion Policy 2014-2020.
The process of the Disaster Risk Assessment (DRA) development is therefore more 
vital than the outcome. Prevention is better that cure when it comes to natural and 
man-made disasters. However, the hazards and threats facing a community may not be 
known and, even if they are, funding is rarely if ever sufficient to address all of them at 
the same time. In addition, policy-makers are increasingly required to prioritize the use 
of scarce resources in an uncertain planning environment. Pressures from the electorate 
may cause public policy to increase community vulnerability by supporting development 
in unsafe areas, adopting unsafe building practices and diverging funds from emergency 
management. 
The purpose of a risk assessment is to support decision-making in an uncertain 
environment, by identifying the hazards and threats that a community is facing and 
comparing their expected consequences. The process of developing a risk assessment is 
fundamentally an educational endeavor that can foster a shared understanding of the 
challenges that a community needs to address. 
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This study provides an innovative comprehensive approach to the development of 
disaster risk assessments as strategic planning tools for communities and countries. It 
outlines the procedure and main steps, to identify and manage the risks and describes 
the methodology for developing a disaster risk assessment in a defined territory. Finally, 
this methodology is applied to the Maltese islands with a view of evaluating the risk from 
known threats and hazards that have potential to significant impact to the Malta’s security.
Methodology
The European Commission Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines (EC, 2010) 
adopt the risk assessment process established in ISO 31000:2009 (ISO, 2009). This process 
(figure 1) is used as a baseline for the National Disaster Risk assessment methodology.
Figure 1: Risk assessment and management process
Source: (ISO, 2009)
The developed methodology employs a 7-step process with several sub-steps (Table 1). 
Risks are identified, analysed, evaluated and mapped based on the procedure defined for 
each step and sub-steps. The analysis is based on historical records, statistical data, and 
information on consequences for each hazard, questionnaires, vulnerability assessments, 
expert judgment and testing scenarios.
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Table 1: Risk Assessment methodology steps and sub-steps
Risk scenarios are necessary to address the uncertainty inherent in risk assessment. 
A scenario is a plausible description of how the future may develop. Scenario building 
is mainly based on experiences from the past, but also events and impacts which have 
so far not occurred should be considered. Scenarios should be based on a coherent 
and internally consistent set of assumptions about key relationships and driving forces 
(EC, 2010).The following paragraphs summarize each step of the national disaster risk 
assessment methodology.
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1. Context analysis
Context analysis is the initial step of the methodological approach (Kendon, 1990). 
It articulates the objectives, defines external and internal parameters to be taken into 
account and sets the scope and risk criteria for the remaining process. It involves two 
main sub-steps:
1.1 Establish the analysis context at national level
This includes establishing the external context (i.e. national and international legal 
and regulatory requirements, stakeholder perceptions, technological and economic 
context), the internal context (Civil Protection Department culture and tasks, measures, 
policies and strategies in place, information systems, information flows and decision-
making process, standards and guidelines adopted by the managing authority, contractual 
relationships) and the context of the risk management process (goals, scope and objectives, 
responsibilities and accountabilities, organisational structure, products and services to be 
delivered). The scope is to define general objectives and decision-making criteria as a first 
approximation, to be refined at a later stage.
1.2 Establish risk criteria and indicators
The established criteria and risk indicators that will be used in steps 3 (risk analysis) 
and 5 (risk evaluation), will reflect the values, objectives and resources:
•	 They are directly related to risk acceptability and inherently have a social and 
political dimension (Slovic, 2000);
•	 They will be derived from national and European legal and regulatory 
requirements, using an iterative process that requires feedback from steps 2 and 3.
•	 The nature and type of causes and consequences and their respective metric, 
definitions and timeframe(s) for likelihood and/or consequences and the different 
levels of risk will be analysed. Exposure indicators (e.g. duration, intensity, extent 
and likelihood), threat and vulnerability indicators (e.g. contextual site factors, 
vulnerable elements, aggravating factors) and consequence indicators (e.g. costs 
for repair, deaths) related to each national case will also be defined. Data relevance 
and availability on the appropriate scale should be verified at this step.
2. Risk identification
Risk identification is the process aimed at identifying sources of risk (hazards in the 
context of physical harm), areas of impact, their causes and potential consequences. 
It is a screening exercise and it serves as a preliminary step for the subsequent risk 
analysis stage. Potential sources of information for the risk identification could include 
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official government reports, papers, publications, newspaper or media articles, or even 
anecdotal information from long-time residents. Although information collection will be 
hazard- and threat-specific, structured interviews with experts and analysis of existing 
documentation will be the primary information collection approaches (EC, 2010).
The goal of the risk identification is to screen risk sources and select those risks that 
pose a significant threat. The result is a selection of risk scenarios to be further analyzed 
at the risk analysis stage (stage 3). It includes an overview of the various risks and a 
description of the single- and multi-risk scenarios to be further analysed during the risk 
analysis stage.
The risk identification involves the following two sub-steps:
•	 Identify risk sources:  The objective is to generate a list of potential hazards 
and elements that alone or in combination are likely to generate detrimental 
consequences; it basically involves the identification of hazards that could threaten 
the territory of the Maltese Islands;
•	 Identify risk sequence and plausible single and multi-risk scenarios. The objective 
is to acquire a good understanding of the risk process, from the event source to 
the related consequences and identify plausible scenarios for single and combined 
hazards.
3 Risk analysis
Risk analysis involves an understanding of the risks in depth. It provides input to 
risk evaluation and serves as a decision basis for determining whether risks need to be 
considered. For every risk and risk scenario identified in the previous identification 
stage, the risk analysis process carries out a detailed estimation of the probability of its 
occurrence and the severity of the potential impacts. Quantitative data are sought, were 
available. Where quantitative data are unavailable, scenario analysis is  based on qualitative 
information. The EC Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines require that national risk 
analysis incorporates at least hazard and vulnerability analysis. Therefore, risk analysis 
involves three sub-steps: hazard analysis, vulnerability assessment and loss estimation.
3.1 Hazard analysis
Once the hazard, threat and risk identification is completed, a hazard profile will be 
built by addressing the following information for each hazard (Godschalk et al., 1997; 
Brower & Bohl, 2000):
•	 Delineate the location and boundaries of hazardous areas;
•	 Delineate the magnitude of potential hazards. Magnitude is measured in a 
different way for each hazard;
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•	 Delineate the likelihood of occurrence of hazardous events. The probability of 
occurrence of hazard is generally difficult to determine; at minimum, a repetitive 
probability scale will be used (Karagiannis et al., 2013); and
•	 Describe and analyze the separate characteristics of potential hazards and threats.
3.2 Vulnerability analysis
The objective is to identify the characteristics and circumstances of the community 
that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard (UNISDR, 2009). Vulnerability 
is analysed against a hazard; therefore, once a hazard has been profiled, vulnerability can 
be analysed by looking into the following questions (Godschalk et al., 1997; Brower & 
Bohl, 2000):
•	 Assess the number of people exposed to hazards and threats, including special 
populations (e.g., elderly, hospitalised);
•	 Assess the value of property exposed to hazards;
•	 Assess critical infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, bridges, water and sewage treatment 
plants, schools, power plants, and police and fire stations) exposed to hazardous 
forces, using the criteria established in the European Critical Infrastructures 
(ECI) Directive;
•	 Assess the danger from secondary hazards (e.g. dam breaking);
•	 Assess the danger from hazardous facilities (e.g. chemical plant) in hazard areas;
•	 Assess the danger from exposure to hazardous materials in wake of natural 
disaster; and
•	 Assess environmental impacts of a disaster.
Various techniques can be used to inventory the people and assets (property, critical 
facilities, hazardous facilities etc.) that could be exposed to hazards. Data from urban 
planning data, national cadaster data, population census data, fiscal data, industrial data 
and other sources can be used as required and appropriate. The overall objective at this 
point is to determine as accurately as possible which parts of the community can be 
exposed to the hazards that have been previously identified and analysed.
3.3 Loss estimation
The purpose is to estimate the consequences of disastrous events (hazards) to people, 
buildings, and other important assets identified above. Consequences are estimated in 
terms of potential losses using a deterministic approach that can directly yield the risk 
severity (Karagiannis, 2012). The potential losses from the occurrence of a hazard are 
actually a function of the intensity of the hazard and the community’s vulnerability to that 
hazard.
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Therefore, one needs to analyze the information gathered during risk identification, 
hazard analysis and vulnerability analysis. Loss estimation is a two-step process:
•	 The first step is to calculate the extent of damage from any given hazard. Damages 
from a hazard are calculated in terms of losses to structures; losses to contents of 
buildings; losses of structure use and function; and human losses; and  
•	 Then, the total losses due to a specific hazard event can be estimated by adding 
the losses to structures, to building contents, to structure use and function, and 
human losses for all assets identified within a community (FEMA, 2001).
4 Critical infrastructure assessment
The loss or disruption of critical infrastructures, such as power, water, transportation 
and communications, is particularly important in the framework of multi-risk scenarios 
addressing natural disasters, e.g. earthquakes and tsunamis, and terrorist events (ENISA, 
2013), including cyber-threats. However, the new and emerging threats faced by critical 
infrastructure assets and systems, in conjunction with the interdependencies among 
them at national and European level, makes it virtually impossible to keep addressing 
critical infrastructure safety in the traditional, hazard-based way. A systems approach has 
therefore been used for the assessment of critical infrastructure assets and systems (Figure 
2) .
Figure 2: Critical infrastructure assessment core methodology 
Source: (adapted from Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2013)
It is important to note that the assessment of critical infrastructures was not conducted 
as a separate exercise from the remainder of the risk assessment. Rather, the identification 
of hazards and threats, and the analysis and evaluation of the risks thereof, have been 
conducted simultaneously with the assessment of critical infrastructure assets and systems. 
This combination of the contingency and systems approaches has proven highly useful 
and has been a major improvement to the overall outcome compared with traditional risk 
assessment approaches.
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The identification of critical infrastructure is based on the guidelines established in 
Annex III of EU Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European 
Critical Infrastructures (ECIs) and assessment of the need to improve their protection. 
Specific criteria will be determined in consultation with the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) Directorate. Therefore, the list of criteria is likely to include:
•	 the necessity of the infrastructure for the maintenance of vital societal functions, 
health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people;
•	 severity of impact;
•	 the availability of alternatives;
•	 the duration of disruption/recovery; and
•	 the potential impact of the disruption to other EU Member-States (ECI).
Critical infrastructure can include, but not be limited to, the following:
•	 Energy (electricity, oil, gas, renewable energy)
•	 Transportation (road, rail, air, water – inland and ocean)
•	 Communications and information technology
•	 Emergency services
•	 Healthcare and public health
•	 Water, wastewater services and dams
•	 Food and agriculture
•	 Commercial, critical manufacturing and chemical facilities
•	 Financial services
•	 Government facilities
•	 Defense facilities
5 Risk evaluation
Risk evaluation involves comparing the level of risk found during the analysis process 
with the risk criteria established when the context was considered. It involves two main 
sub-steps: the risk matrix and the level of acceptable risk.
5.1 Risk matrix
The Contract, and the EU Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines and the Standard 
on Risk Management (ISO 31000:2009) require that each risk must be assessed on the 
basis of its likelihood and its consequences, using a risk matrix that is appropriate to the 
country level of risk. From the matrix, there emerges a measure of the severity of the risk, 
and a recommendation on how to proceed. A system for assessing the severity of a risk 
requires three components: 
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•	 A multi-level scale for rating the likelihood (or the probability of occurrence) of 
a risk; 
•	 A multi-level scale for rating the consequences (or the severity of impacts) of a 
risk; and 
•	 A matrix for scoring each possible combination of likelihood (probability) and 
consequences (impacts). 
The ISO standard requires that the three components be realistic within the context of 
the analysis and reflect the perception of risk within the specific country.
Risk matrices are commonly used in risk assessments, as they help illustrate the 
relative prioritisation of each hazard according to the combination of their probability 
of occurrence and severity of impact. A 5×5 risk matrix (Table 2) can be used in risk 
assessments (EC, 2010). Each risk is represented by a point on a risk matrix. This point 
corresponds to a defined degree of probability of occurrence and severity of impact (Cox, 
2008).
Table 2: A 5×5 risk matrix 
    
Source: (EC, 2010)
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Determining the probability of occurrence of a hazard is a key step in a risk assessment. 
The probability of occurrence for a known hazard will normally have been determined 
during the risk analysis phase. A qualitative or quantitative (depending on available data) 
scale should be used. The qualitative and quantitative scales illustrated on Table 3 will be 
used to provide a relative likelihood of the occurrence of a hazard.
Table 3: 5-class probability scale 
A hazard’s severity of impact on a given community also needs to be determined if 
the risk from the hazard to that community is to be estimated. The severity of the impact 
of a hazard is actually a function of the intensity of the hazard and the community’s 
vulnerability to that hazard. It is therefore determined by analyzing the hazard’s own 
characteristics (e.g. location, boundaries, magnitude, intensity etc.), which have been 
determined during the risk identification and analysis phases. The result of the combined 
analysis of hazards and vulnerabilities is the estimation of potential losses. A deterministic 
approach is used to estimate losses from the occurrence of a hazard.
The estimated losses can be directly used as an indication of the hazard’s severity of 
impact in a risk assessment. Severity ratings need to be consistent for all hazards; otherwise 
the purpose of performing a risk assessment is defeated. Table 4 illustrates the scale of 
severity ratings that will be used.
5.2 Determine the acceptable level of risk
In this step the acceptability of risks is determined based on the risk criteria adopted, 
risk standards and regulations, tipping points (e.g. technical, financial, spatial or societal/
cultural acceptable limits) and uncertainty considered based on the precautionary 
principle. The choice of probability and severity scales reflects the level of acceptable risk 
in the nation. Research has shown that risk acceptability depends on psychological factors 
and has a strong social and political dimension (Slovic, 2000).
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Table 4: 5-class severity scale 
Source: (adapted from FEMA, 2007)
Once the probability of occurrence and the severity of impact of a hazard are 
determined, a risk level can be defined. Generally, the higher the risk level, the higher 
priority must be given to the prevention measures aimed at that risk. In addition, risks 
with high probability of occurrence or high severity of impact should be given particular 
attention.
6 Risk mapping
Maps are useful tools that can be used to support risk assessment. They show 
information about hazards, vulnerabilities and risks in a particular area and thereby 
support the risk assessment process and overall risk management strategy. They can 
help set priorities for risk reduction strategies (EC, 2010). Maps are especially useful for 
hazards that can be spatially defined.
Risk mapping is being increasingly used with the advent of information technology 
and aerial photography for civilian purposes, both of which enable the development of 
Digital Terrain Models (DTMs) and Geographical Information Systems (GIS). A GIS is in 
essence a digital map (based on a digital terrain model), upon which additional layers are 
overlaid to describe specific types of information, such as demographic factors, the built 
environment, networks, topography, geophysical phenomena etc. (Alexander, 2002). In 
addition, maps can help assess the reliability, validity, spatial specificity, and relevance of 
the existing hazard data.
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A base map will include the following descriptive categories of shapefiles or coverages:
•	 Built-up areas (by population size/census data)
•	 Roads and Bridges
•	 Transportation Grids
•	 Telecommunication Grid
•	 Sources of Energy 
•	 Energy Facilities/Utilities and Power Grids
•	 Environmentally Regulated Facilities
•	 Forests/Vegetation
•	 Fire Service locations
•	 Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) NATURA 2000
•	 Special Protected Areas (SPAs)
•	 Watersheds/Dams/Water Utilities
•	 Land cover/use
•	 Town Planning Zones
•	 National Cadastral maps 
•	 Soils
•	 Digital Elevation Models (DEMs)
•	 Topography
Based on this base map, three types of maps are developed:
6.1 Hazard maps are used to represent critical characteristics of each hazard; 
6.2 Vulnerability maps illustrate the spatial distribution of elements at risk, including 
but not limited to people (population density maps), property, critical infrastructure or 
the environment; and
6.3 Risk maps are a combination of the information included in hazard maps 
and vulnerability maps. They provide an estimation of the level of risk based on the 
combination of likelihood and impact of a certain event as well as for aggregated hazards 
(Alexander, 2002)
7 Develop Risk Reduction and Management Strategies
Risk Reduction and Management Strategies are developed based on the knowledge 
gained throughout the risk identification, analysis and evaluation processes:
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•	 It is perhaps the most important part of the entire risk assessment endeavor.;
•	 It clarifies the objectives of the policy by determining precise and measurable 
statements of the intended results to be achieved at different levels; and 
•	 It defines the course of action to be followed to achieve the results, as well as the 
indicators by which to measure those results. 
The development of Risk Reduction and Management Strategies includes the following 
two steps:
7.1 Capability assessment
The capability assessment and the risk assessment form the “fact basis” of the Risk 
Reduction and Management Strategies. The capability analysis should outline the strengths 
and weaknesses of the institutional mechanism to deal with risk mitigation. The capability 
assessment will review existing prevention policies, as well as any problems associated 
with current policies; opportunities for and obstacles to new prevention initiatives; the 
level of present effort devoted to prevention; and intergovernmental coordination of 
programs (Brower & Bohl, 2000). Capability assessment is a two-step process: Exploring 
the existing policies, laws and actions that may affect vulnerability and investigating the 
capability of government departments and agencies.
7.2 Develop strategies
Risk Reduction and Management Strategies should not merely refer to the purposes 
of the risk assessment as a document (e.g. to fulfill EU requirements). Strategies should 
instead refer to the ultimate ends of risk reduction that the nation is trying to achieve. 
Risk Reduction and Management Strategies should be broad in scope and far-reaching in 
application, and they should be structured as positive statements that are attainable rather 
than negative observations about the community. Strategies should be cross-cutting in 
areas of public interest in addition to disaster prevention. For instance, strategies can 
support such principles as improving water quality, preserving natural areas, and creating 
open space (Schwab et al., 2007).
The first step in a risk reduction and management strategy is to define its goals, i.e. the 
intended effect of the policy. A goal is defined as the long-term results that a policy seeks 
to achieve, which may be contributed to by factors outside the policy itself. Once defined, 
goals are broken down in objectives, which define the primary results that the policy seeks 
to achieve in order to accomplish a goal (IFRC, 2010). A goal may include one or more 
objectives. Although there is no limitation as to the number of objectives per goal, three or 
four are usually adequate, otherwise the project could become rather complex.
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The difference between goals and objectives can be quite subtle. The goals explain the 
long-term reasons why the community chooses to undertake a prevention policy (e.g. “to 
ensure public safety”). The objectives, on the other hand, are more specific, measurable, and 
intermediate ends which are achievable and mark progress toward the goals (e.g. “reduce 
population in at-risk areas by fifty percent”). The goals and objectives should be articulated 
clearly at the start of the disaster prevention planning process to inform the selection of 
the proposed strategy which makes up the heart of the plan. Individual objectives will 
vary widely depending on a number of factors, such as the nature of the hazard threat, the 
level of local and regional resources, and the time frame for implementation of the plan 
(Brower & Bohl, 2000).
Finally, each objective may be broken down into disaster prevention measures or 
activities. Activities are the collection of tasks that produce the tangible products, goods 
and services and other immediate results that lead to the achievement of objectives (IFRC, 
2010). One objective may have two or more measures/activities. Although there is no 
limitation as to the number of activities per objective, more than 7 activities per objective 
could make the policy too complex to realize in the field.
Malta Test Application
The aforementioned methodology, has been selected to be applied in the country of 
Maltese Island. The geographical coverage of the NRA includes Malta’s territory, territorial 
waters and air space. However, the analysis was extended outside Maltese territory in some 
cases, as appropriate. For example, oil spill and marine pollution risk analysis required 
information about Malta’s continental shelf, while the analysis of aviation accident risks 
will naturally extend throughout Malta’s Flight Information Region (Camillieri, 2003 & 
2006, Chetcuti, Buhagiar, Schembri and Ventura,, 1992) .
Malta’s National Risk Assessment focuses on three types of risks:
•	 Contingency events with defined beginning and endpoints, such as floods, 
hurricanes, earthquakes, terrorist attacks;
•	 Chronic societal concerns, such as illegal immigration, and others not generally 
related to national disaster preparedness, including traffic accidents and money 
laundering;
•	 Loss or disruption of critical infrastructure.
The output of the risk identification phase is the identification of hazards and threats. 
A total of 33 hazards and threats (with 42 scenarios), and 3 horizontal issues have been 
identified in the Maltese National Risk Assessment.
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Risk analysis involves an understanding of the risks in depth. For each of the 10 risks 
selected at the hazard and threat identification stage, the risk analysis process carried out 
a detailed estimation of the probability of its occurrence and the severity of the potential 
impacts. The end result of the risk analysis is the severity and probability of occurrence of 
the selected hazard and threat scenarios, which serve as input to the risk evaluation stage. 
The output of this phase was a detailed risk analysis and evaluation of Malta’s top hazards 
and threats. 
The goal of the assessment and mapping of critical infrastructures is to identify critical 
assets and systems that are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, 
safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or loss thereof 
would have a significant impact in Malta as a result of the failure to maintain those 
functions.
In addition, throughout the NRA exercise, more than 500 critical and other relevant 
infrastructure assets and systems have been identified. Based on the results of the 
assessment and mapping of critical infrastructure, two additional National Planning 
Scenarios were identified. At the same time a series of GIS-based systems and a GIS 
application have been developed to support the NRA exercise. Also, a separate Risk 
Reduction and Management Strategies Report has been prepared. It defines the course of 
action to be followed to achieve the results, as well as the indicators by which to measure 
those results. The following table (Table 5) briefly present these strategies that stem from 
the National Risk Assessment exercise:
 Table 5: Risk Reduction and Management Strategies
Conclusion
Natural hazards can cause serious disruption to societies and their infrastructure 
networks. The impact of extreme hazard events is largely dependent on the resilience of 
societies and their networks. The Disaster Risk assessment methodology which is described 
above, performs a critical decision support role in maintenance decision making. Malta’s 
test application was conducted as a comprehensive exercise aimed at identifying sources 
of risk and understanding of the risks and their consequences in depth.
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